Corporate governance and the importance of societal and cultural factors : an argument against calling time on UK boardroom rules. by Attenborough,  D.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
06 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Attenborough, D. (2010) 'Corporate governance and the importance of societal and cultural factors : an
argument against calling time on UK boardroom rules.', European business law review., 21 (4). pp. 559-572.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journalsid=EULR2010027
Publisher's copyright statement:
Reprinted from European business law review, 21(4), 2010, 559-572, with permission of Kluwer Law International.
Additional information:
Article ID: EULR2010027
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE [2010] EBLR 559
Corporate Governance and the Importance of Societal and 
Cultural Factors: An Argument Against Calling Time on UK 
Boardroom Rules
DANIEL ATTENBOROUGH*
I. Introduction
Corporate governance has in recent years been a much discussed topic in econom-
ics, management, business ethics, corporate law, and other disciplines. Surprisingly, 
it has not always been a commonplace term. In fact, two decades ago there was no 
evidence that it would attract the public interest and dominate the headlines of legal, 
business and financial newspapers. Its growth can be attributed to the failure of the 
commercial world to keep up with the pace of corporate development. This failure 
took the form of financial scandals and corporate collapses in the United States1 
and Western Europe – such as the collapses in the UK of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International,2 Polly Peck,3 and the Maxwell empire4 – around the turn 
of the twenty-first century, and the global economic crisis beginning with the sub-
prime mortgage scandal in the US. Within the UK, discussion has been dominated 
by the circumstances surrounding the forced support of mortgage lenders, such as 
RBS and Northern Rock, and their subsequent ‘public acquisition’ and future com-
mercial viability. On the other side of the Atlantic we have witnessed, amongst 
others, the forced purchase of financial services firm Bear Sterns by JP Morgan in 
March 2008, and the collapse of Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
September of the same year. These events have had a deep impact on the psychol-
ogy of all involved parties, namely, investors, legislators, corporate directors and 
the general public. Inevitably, corporate governance has attracted a lot of attention 
and is in the top of every agenda about the best and most efficient regulatory 
framework repair organisational ills and corporate failures. 
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Leicester. An earlier version of this article appears 
as a chapter in a collective book project, which is printed and translated into French: ‘L’importance 
des facteurs socioculturels dans la gouvernance : plaidoyer contre l’installation de la structure dualiste 
au Royaume-Uni’ in V. Magnier, (ed.) La Gouvernance des Sociétés Cotées Face à la Crise (Paris, 
Lextenso, 2010). 
1 The US has produced a voluminous amount of literature. See, for instance, KF Brickley, ‘From 
Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime after Sarbanes-Oxley’ 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 357; 
JC Coffee Jnr, ‘Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”’(2002) 57 Bus. Law. 1403. 
For a representative UK example, see A Walters, ‘Directors’ Duties: the Impact of the Company Direc-
tors Disqualiﬁcation Act 1986’ 21(4) Co. Law., 110. 
2 Financial Times, 9 November 1991, p. 1.
3 Financial Times, 2 October 1990, p. 27; and Financial Times, 25 October 1990, pp. 1 and 24.
4 Financial Times, 6 December 1991, p. 21.
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The global economic crisis raises many corporate governance issues and the UK 
government has initiated a review of corporate governance in the banking industry 
in particular. The Chancellor of the Exchequer commented that “corporate governance 
should have been far more effective in holding bank executives to account”.5 As a 
result, an independent review to recommend measures to improve the corporate gov-
ernance of banks, in particular risk management, was announced on February 9, 2009 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform and the Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury. The 
review will examine risk management issues (including the effectiveness of risk and 
audit committees), incentives to manage risk in bank remuneration policies, the  com -
petences needed on bank boards, board practices and structures, and the role played 
by institutional shareholders.6 The final recommendations were published on 
26 November 2009.7 It parallels calls from the academic and business communities 
for radical reform of corporate governance structures. Most notably, in a recent inter-
view with The Times newspaper,8 Sir Richard Greenbury, the chief architect of 
UK boardroom rules in the 1990s, performed a reversal on what he thinks will cure 
Britain’s corporate ills. Following the system of board guidelines and rules ﬁrst 
crafted by Sir Adrian Cadbury in 1991,9 and later built on by his own report in 1995,10 
and the Higgs review in 2003,11 which favoured the non-executive director as the 
guardian against executive misconduct, he now favours the continental style two-tier 
board. 
The detailed theoretical analysis of corporate governance in the broadest sense 
goes beyond the scope of this article, so we will focus on the key issues relating to 
the reform of board structures of UK corporations. It is worthwhile to note at this 
point that while British corporations are governed by a single unitary board of direc-
tors, where executives and non-executives mingle and are equally responsible, many 
European corporations, such as Germany and France, have a two-tier structure – a 
supervisory board of non-executive directors to which a management board of exec-
utives reports.12 Now, it is not the intention of this article to engage in a debate over 
the doctrinal and normative merits of the two styles of board structure, but to address 
5 HM Treasury, Press Release, 10/09, 9 February 2009, ‘Independent review of corporate govern-
ance of UK banking industry by Sir David Walker’.
6 <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_10_09.htm> [Accessed 29 September 2009].
7 Walker Review of Corporate Governance of UK Banking Industry’ and can be accessed at: 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf [Accessed 17 April 2010].
8 http://business.timesonline/co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_ﬁnance/arti-
cle5983510.ece> [Accessed 29 September 2009]. 
9 The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report with Code of Best 
Practice (London, Gee Publishing, 1992) (Sir Adrian Cadbury, Committee Chair). 
10 The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Study Group on Directors’ 
Remuneration (London, Gee Publishing, 1995) (Sir Richard Greenbury, Committee Chair). 
11 Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (2003), and can 
be accessed at: < http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle23012.pdf>[Accessed 29 September 2009]. 
12 Europe represents a wide range of corporate governance practices. States such as France, Swit-
zerland, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and much of Northern Europe evolved their governance systems 
along Roman-Germanic, rather than Anglo-American lines.
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the issue of how receptive UK corporate governance might be in facilitating a conti-
nental type of management rules. The structure of this article is as follows. Part II 
attempts to provide context to the origins and inter-disciplinary interpretations of the 
expression corporate governance. Part III provides an outline, albeit a brief one due 
to time constraints, of the two types of board structure and composition, together with 
a summary of some signiﬁcant similarities and differences of the two models. The 
issues broadly discussed by theory, on which we give some comparative analysis, 
thus ﬁrst relate to the issue of the composition of a board (single or dual) and the 
distribution of powers between non-executive and executive management. The aim 
of Part IV is to investigate whether it is structurally possible to transfer the German 
two-tier board, which is obligatory for a relatively small number of German corpora-
tions, into the UK corporate legal system. The upshot of this analysis points up the 
fact that current research into corporate governance has not incorporated cultural and 
societal elements in a substantial form. Part V concludes by a summary and drawing 
some key points from the general discussion. 
II. Understanding the Notions of Corporate Governance
As one commentator has pointed up, “each generation must conduct the corporate 
governance debate within the parameters set by the prevailing manifestation of 
corporatism”.13 So far there is a voluminous amount of literature that has been 
already written, with a view to understand the implications of corporate governance 
and to formulate recommendations on suitable governance structures and practices. 
Scholars and academics, governments and legislators, managers and directors are 
all involved in this on-going discussion, with a view to find the right answer to the 
questions of what is the most effective corporate governance regulation and also 
what is the form of regulation that will act as a protective shield for corporations 
worldwide against fraud, dishonesty, mismanagement and corruption. It is a well 
settled tenet that it is a complicated task to attempt to define such a wide term as 
corporate governance,14 because it potentially covers a large number of distinct 
legal and economic phenomena. One commentator argues that “[i]t is a fashionable 
concept but like most fashionable ideas it is remarkably imprecise”.15 The “absence 
of any real consensus”16 or “coherence, either empirically, methodologically or 
theoretically”,17 on the definition is indicative of the complexity of the subject 
13 M Lipton, ‘Corporate Governance in the age of Finance Corporatism’ (1992) 136(1) U. Penn-
sylvania L. Rev., 1, 3.
14 J Du Plessis, ‘Corporate Law and Corporate Governance Lessons from the Past: ebbs and ﬂows, 
but far from “the end of history…”: Part 1’ (2009) 30(2) Co. Law.43. 
15 J Farrar, ‘Opinion, Corporate Governance’ (1998) 10(2) Bond Law Review, Special Issue: C.G., 
141. 
16 K Keasey, S Thompson, and M Wright, Corporate Governance: Economic Management and 
Financial Issues (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), at 7. 
17 A Pettigrew, ‘On Studying Managerial Elites’ (1992) 13(1) Strategic Management Journal, 163.
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 matter. Accordingly, economists, organisation theorists, lawyers, sociologists, and 
even political scientists, laying claim to its meaning, interpretation and applications, 
have tended to give the expression a wide variety of competing definitions. Each 
adopted definition essentially reflects the special interest of its creator in the field 
of  corporate governance, because every rigorous analysis needs a good definition 
as a starting point. 
To illustrate this point, Economists and Social Scientists tend to deﬁne it broadly 
as “the structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful oper-
ation of the organisation”,18 and “the organisations and the rules that affect expecta-
tions about the exercise of control of resources in ﬁrms”.19 These deﬁnitions focus 
not only on the formal rules and institutions of corporate governance, but also on the 
informal practices that evolve in the absence of weakness of formal rules.20 Moreover, 
they encompass not only the internal structure of the corporation but also its external 
environment, including capital and labour markets, bankruptcy systems and govern-
ment competition policies. Lawyers, on the other hand, tend to employ a more narrow 
deﬁnition. For them, corporate governance is a system of rules and institutions that 
determine the control and direction of the corporation and that deﬁne relations among 
the corporation’s primary participants. Thus the United Kingdom’s 1992 Cadbury 
Report’s often quoted deﬁnition is: “Corporate governance is the system by which 
businesses are directed and controlled”.21 As applied in practice, this narrower deﬁni-
tion focuses almost exclusively on the internal structure and operation of the corpora-
tion’s decision-making processes. It has been this narrower deﬁnition that has been 
central to public policy discussions about corporate governance in most countries,22 
and it will provide the focus of attention for this article. 
Apart from the academic discipline, the discussion is also particular to the geo-
graphical and historical relativity in which it is studied. It is fair to suggest that a 
common misconception and perhaps assumption about corporate governance is that 
it is a functional and mechanistic concept. It has been suggested23 that because cor-
porate governance is a multi-faceted subject, this may help to explain why many 
governance measures are articulated as ‘principles’ by international organisations like 
18 J Cook, & S Deakin, ‘Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on Eco-
nomic Performance’ ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, (1999), at 2.
19 World Bank, ‘Building Institutions for Markets: World Bank Development Report’ (2002) and 
can be accessed at: <http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm>, 68 [Accessed 29 
September 2009].
20 A Dyck, ‘Privatisation and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence, and Future Challenges’ 
(2001) 16(1) World Bank Observer, 59. 
21 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, ‘Report with Code of Best Prac-
tice’ (London, Gee Publishing, 1992), para. 2.5 This document can be accessed at: <http://www.ecgi.
org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf> [Accessed 29 September 2009].
22 JW Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) 25(3) Co. Law. 69, 70.
23 A Young, ‘Rethinking the Fundamentals of Corporate Governance: the relevance of culture in the 
global age’ (2008) 29(6) Co. Law.168, 169. 
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OECD rather than as ‘standards’.24 So, if there is no all-inclusive governance regime 
applicable to every country, this suggests that a given country’s corporate governance 
system will be characterised by speciﬁc elements. As discussed later, it is suggested 
here that from one country to another, considerations like social norms and cultural 
values will inﬂuence how corporations are run and the types of laws being enacted.25 
Often historical, political and economic factors also serve as country-speciﬁc barriers. 
To be sure, Anglo-American corporate governance concentrates upon the internal 
structure of the company. This approach limits the objective of corporate governance 
to proﬁt maximisation since it prioritises the interests of the shareholders.26 This can 
be contrasted with the ‘stakeholder’ approach,27 which has inﬂuenced corporate gov-
ernance developments more strongly in other countries, especially some member 
states.28 It is potentially a broader deﬁnition of corporate governance, since it addresses 
the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ aspects of corporate activity, and recognises the relation-
ship between the company and the community and goes beyond the notion of proﬁt 
maximisation is the only relevant objective of the enterprise. The upshot of this sec-
tion is that the priorities in the debate on the management and control of corporations 
vary, and its intensity and nature are also different depending on the country in which 
it is taking place.29 
24 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004).
25 A Young, ‘Rethinking the Fundamentals of Corporate Governance’, 168, 170. 
26 For a representative sample, see generally H Hansmann, & R Kraakman, ‘The End of History 
for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown L. J. 439; M Roe, ‘The Shareholder Wealth Maximisation 
Norm and Industrial Organization’ (2001) 149 U. Pennsylvania L. Rev. 2063; A Alcock, ‘Corporate 
Governance: A Defence of Status Quo’ (1995) 58(6) M.L.R. 898.
27 A Etzioni, ‘A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory’ (1998) 8(4) Bus. Ethics Q., 679; 
T Donaldson, & L Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory for the Corporation : Concepts, Evidence, Implica-
tions’ (1995) 20 Academy Management Review 65; R Karmel, ‘Implications of the Stakeholder Model’ 
(1993) 61 George Wash. L. Rev. 1156; R Mitchell, ‘Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identiﬁcation and 
Salience: Deﬁning the Principle of Who and What Really Counts’ (1997) 22 Academy Management 
Review 853; P Goldenberg, ‘IALS Company Law Lecture: Shareholders v Stakeholders: The Bogus 
Argument’ (1998) 19(2) Co. Law. 34.
28 In France, the Viénot Report emphasised that the ‘interests of the company may be understood as 
an overriding claim of the company as a separate economic agent, pursuing its own objectives which 
are distinct from those of shareholders, employees, creditors including the internal revenue authorities, 
suppliers and customers. It none the less represents the common interest of all these persons which is 
for the company to remain in business and prosper’. See The Boards of Directors of Listed Companies 
in France, Report of the Viénot Committee’ (July, 1995). Under German law, a management board is 
required to run the corporation in the interests of the corporation as a whole. Shareholders are regarded 
as only a part of the differing groups of ‘stakeholders’. 
29 Centre for European Policy Studies, ‘Corporate Governance in Europe: Report of a CEPS Work-
ing Party’ (1995) CEPS Working Report No. 12, 2. 
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III. Reform of Corporate Governance Structures
A.    UK Law and Guidelines on the Composition and Structure of the Board
An important difference between legal systems is whether they require single-tier 
or two-tier boards.30 The single-tier board remains the norm in the UK,31 the United 
States and the Commonwealth. In large corporations, with numerous and dispersed 
shareholding bodies, the central management is necessarily in the hands of the 
board. The board of directors is the most important decision making body with the 
corporation. Yet English corporate law has traditionally specified very little about 
how this body should operate. In a corporation with a small number of sharehold-
ers, who may also be the directors, the board will generally be actively involved 
in managing the business of the corporation. In a corporation that is sufficiently 
large that active management by the board is no longer feasible, the board oversees 
management rather than managing the company’s business itself. In large public 
corporations, it is customary to find a board made up of executive and non-execu-
tive directors. The distinction between executive and non-executive directors has 
no significance in English corporate law for these are essentially business terms. 
Executive directors are those directors concerned with the actual management of 
the corporation. They have considerable discretion in conducting the business of 
the corporation. They will have extensive management powers delegated to them 
by the articles of association, and they typically have service contracts with the 
corporation, which, together with the articles, delimit their powers and responsi-
bilities.32 Further, the executive directors are appointed33 and removed34 by share-
holder democracy. Non-executive directors are directors without executive 
management responsibilities but who are concerned with general management 
policy and strategy and the monitoring of the executive directors, although their 
precise role (particularly with respect to their monitoring responsibilities) is the 
30 A third system exists in Belgium, France and, again differently, in Switzerland, where the cor-
porations can choose between either of the structures, the unitary board being much more common. 
This is referred to as the “conseil d’administration” in French corporations. In France, more and more 
corporations are making use of the possibility provided by the law to entrust their management to an 
executive “directoire” and a supervisory “conseil de surveillance”.
31 However, although the single-tier board is what is normally found in the UK, it is not obvious 
that the law requires a single board. The Companies Act 2006 does not require the directors to act as 
a board and so it hardly needs to address the further question of whether the board is to be a one-tier 
or a two-tier board.
32 See e.g., Art 70 Table A of the Companies Act 1985. Besides authorising the directors to conduct 
the affairs of the corporation, articles of association also provide that directors are liable in the event 
that they fail to carry out their duties properly. 
33 The Model Articles’ provisions on the appointment of directors are that the board or the general 
meeting of shareholders can appoint a director.
34 As to removal of directors, a very important provision of the Companies Act 2006 (s. 168) is that 
any director can be removed by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders.
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subject of debate.35 They commonly have letter of appointment setting out their 
role and responsibilities. 
It might be fair to suggest that the executive directors see the non-executive direc-
tors as fulﬁlling managerial and strategic responsibilities while shareholders and the 
boarder investing public, and, to some extent, the Government tend to focus on their 
monitoring responsibilities. The focus of the role of non-executive directors received 
its impetus initially from a series of corporate collapses in the late 1980s which raised 
concerns as to the effectiveness of the traditional board structure when dominated by 
powerful executive directors. These concerns prompted the setting up of the Cadbury 
Committee and later the Hampel Committee36 to address issues surrounding the com-
position, structure and effectiveness of boards of directors. At around the same time, 
the Greenbury Committee was asked to consider issues surrounding directors’ remu-
neration. Many commentators believe that non-executive directors can be effective 
in ensuring that the board of a company acts in the interests of the corporation rather 
than a member or members of the board. However, Re Polly Peck International plc 
(No 2)37 shows how unrealistic it is to expect non-executive directors to control a 
determined and powerful managing director. Some scholars have also taken the view 
that non-executive directors often have only limited time or lack of information,38 lack 
of inﬂuence,39 and are reluctant to act as a whistleblower on errant executive directors,40 
to perform all the tasks of ensuring the corporation is correctly managed.41 These 
failings have, to an extent, been pin-pointed, certainly by Sir Richard Greenbury, as 
a contributing factor to the UK’s experiences during the recent global ﬁnancial crisis, 
and led to renewed calls to reconsider the fundamentals of corporate governance. To 
this end, many critics look to Europe. 
35 On non-executive directors generally, see S Kiarie, ‘Non-executive Directors in UK Listed Com-
panies: are they effective?’ (2007) 18(1) I.C.C.L.R. 17; M Sweeney-Baird, ‘The Role of the Non-Exec-
utive Director in Modern Corporate Governance’ (2006) 27 Co. Law. 67; JE Parkinson, ‘Evolution and 
Policy in Company Law: The non-executive director’ in JE Parkinson, A Gamble, and G Kelly, (eds), 
The Political Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing, London, 2000). 
36 The Committee on Corporate Governance, (London, Gee Publishing, 1998) (Sir Ronald Hampel, 
Committee Chair).
37 [1994] 1 BCLC 574.
38 BD Baysinger, & RE Hoskisson, ‘The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: 
Effects on Corporate Strategy’ (1990) 15(1) Academy of Management Review 72, 76.
39 S Kiarie, ‘Non-executive Directors in UK Listed Companies’, 17, 20. 
40 M Sweeney-Baird, ‘The Role of the Non-executive Director in Modern Corporate Governance’, 
67, 70.
41 Although it has been suggested that non-executive directors would be well advised to exercise 
vigilance and shrewdness in the discharge of their monitoring and supervisory duties. See JL Yap, ‘Case 
Comment: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: the total inactivity of non-executive directors’ 
(2009) 20(11) I.C.C.L.R. 412. The author refers to several recent case law decisions that make clear 
that a director will not be able to rely on their lack of involvement as an excuse to avoid the imposi-
tion of liability. Contrast with A Young, ‘Regulating Non-Executive Directors in Australia: a socio-
legal approach’ (2008) 29(11) Co. Law. 323, 327. The author states that in spite of the combination of 
increased legislative obligations and greater scrutiny of the judiciary on non-executive directors’ conduct 
and behaviour, this does not necessarily translate into higher standards apart from increased levels of 
legal risk and higher premiums for professional indemnity insurance.
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B. Board Structures Outside the UK: The Roman-Germanic Example
In order to determine whether the German two-tier board system can deliver 
impulses or ideas for the reform of UK corporate law, it is necessary and essential 
to understand how the system actually works in practice and how the two boards 
share the responsibility in the corporate decision-making process. The two-tier 
board structure is mandatory for every stock corporation (Aktien Gesellschaft, 
AG).42 Under German corporate law, unlike in the UK, a stock corporation must 
have two different boards of directors: a management board (‘vorstände’),43 and a 
supervisory board (‘aufsichtsrat,’),44 which is organised vertically, rather than hor-
izontally.45 There is generally a clear division of powers between the two organs 
of a stock corporation. Each organ has statutory tasks that cannot be delegated to 
another organ, unless the Aktiengesetz 1965 specifically provides otherwise. The 
vorstände have similar powers and functions to executive directors of UK public 
limited corporations. It manages, leads and implements the business affairs of the 
company.46 The main provision concerning the Aktien Gesellschaft’s management 
is s.76(1), which provides: “The management board shall have direct responsibility 
for the management of the company”.47 The German text emphasises that the 
vorstände shall manage the company as a matter of its own responsibility. This is 
an important provision because it means that the vorstände is not bound by instruc-
tions from the company’s shareholders.48 The freedom under the German system 
available to corporate directors to consider purposes other than short-term profit 
maximisation/shareholder value, e.g. employee interest or social interests, arises 
implicitly from the German legislative framework as a whole and the fact that the 
German constitution prescribes a “social” market economy.49 There is also a duty 
to inform the supervisory aufsichtsrat periodically about the current and future 
corporate policy (including financial, human resources and investment planning), 
all major business affairs, revenue numbers, the rate of return, the condition of the 
corporation in general and all maters which might be of significant importance to 
the liquidity or future earning power of the corporation.50 Normally, the vorstände 
42 ss 30, 95, and 96 Aktiengesetz 1965.
43 ss 76–94 Aktiengesetz 1965.
44 ss 95–117 Aktiengesetz 1965.
45 R Kraakman, & H Hansmann, (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a comparative and func-
tional approach (OUP, Oxford, 2004) at 35.
46 s 76 Aktiengesetz 1965.
47 Ibid.
48 G Henn, Handbuch des Aktiengesetz (7th Ed.) (CF Müller, Heidelberg, 2002) at 271–272 in 
HC Hirt, ‘The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties pursuant to the Aktiengesetz: present law and reform 
in Germany: Part 1’ (2005) 16(4) I.C.C.L.R. 179, 181.
49 Article 20 of the Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz ) states: “The Federal Republic of Germany is 
a democratic and social republic.” This is supplemented by Article 14(2) Federal Constitution (Grund-
gesetz ): “Property carries obligations. Its use should simultaneously serve the public good.” 
50 s 90(1) Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) 1965.
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meets on a regular basis (far more often than the supervisory aufsichtsrat) in order 
to comply with its tasks and responsibilities. 
The aufsichtsrat is the control or supervisory organ in the two-tier administration. 
This clear constitutional division between the executive and the supervisors clariﬁes 
the role of the particular directors, and, unlike the UK where employees have tradi-
tionally been excluded from corporate decision-making, makes provision for the 
inclusion of labour representation or co-determination on the board.51 It is a concept 
that dates back to the 1930s when the idea that the exclusive role of the corporation 
was to maximise shareholder wealth was questioned, and the theory of the enterprise 
with a wide range of constituencies with an interest in the corporation came to the 
fore. From a practical point of view, the aufsichtsrat’s main tasks include the supervi-
sion of the vorstände,52 and the representation of the company as against members of 
the vorstände.53 To ensure that these monitoring functions are undertaken correctly, 
the vorstände must inform periodically the aufsichtsrat about the current and future 
corporate policy (including ﬁnancial, human resources and investment matters), all 
major business affairs, revenue numbers, the rate of return, the condition of the cor-
poration in general and all matters which might be of signiﬁcant importance to the 
liquidity or future earning power of the corporation.54 From a legal perspective, the 
duty of members of the vorstände to employ the care of a diligent and conscientious 
manager55 also applies to the members of the aufsichtsrat.56 Further, the aufsichtsrat 
is empowered to terminate the contract of employment of every executive director, 
provided there is an important reason to do so.57 In addition, the corporation’s con-
stitution or the aufsichtsrat itself may determine that certain types of board decisions 
may be entered into (by the vorstände) only with the aufsichtsrat’s consent.58 How-
ever, a fundamental principle is that the supervisory board is not empowered to inter-
fere directly with any of the decisions made by the board of executive directors.59 
Although the executive directors are not bound by direct orders or instructions of the 
aufsichtsrat, effective control is ensured by the fact that the supervisory board gener-
ally elects the board of directors.60 Given the aforementioned principles that are inher-
51 s 1(1) Mitbestimmungsgesetz (Co-determination Act) 1976. For a useful discussion of the his-
torical development of co-determination and the German two-tier board system, see J Du Plessis, & 
O  Sandrock, ‘The Rise and Fall of Supervisory Co-Determination in Germany?’ (2005) 16(2) I.C.C.L.R. 
67.
52 s 111 Aktiengesetz 1965.
53 s 112 Aktiengesetz 1965.
54 s 90(1) Aktiengesetz 1965. Some have suggested that this will be done in a more detached man-
ner than that employed by the “in-house” relationship, which tends to exist between executive and 
non-executive directors in the UK. See T Pryce-Brown, ‘Shareholder Protection – a Cultural Quagmire’ 
(1995) 16(4) Co. Law. 114, 115. 
55 s 93(1) Aktiengesetz 1965.
56 s 116 Aktiengesetz 1965.
57 ss 84–87 Aktiengesetz 1965.
58 s 111(IV 2) Aktiengesetz 1965.
59 s 111(4) Aktiengesetz 1965.
60 s 111(3) Aktiengesetz 1965.
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ent in the structure and composition of the Roman-Germanic management structure, 
with its clear separation of powers, or a more robust, autonomous supervisory board, 
and less of a focus on short-term proﬁt maximisation, there are signiﬁcant points in 
favour of the two-tier board. 
C. The Unitary and Two-Tier Structures Compared
It will be remembered that, as mentioned earlier on, the central thrust of this article 
is to examine the argument that has been advanced by, amongst others, Sir Richard 
Greenbury, for a radical reform of corporate governance structures in the UK in 
favour of the continental-style two-tier board. The discussion above pointed up that 
there are two types of board structures, namely, the unitary board and the two-tier 
board. It is, however, not easy currently to make an exact distinction between these 
two board structures, as most developed countries have moved away from the 
traditional unitary board structure in the case of large public corporations. In most 
jurisdictions that have adopted a single-tier system of corporate governance, the 
management structure for large corporations has some characteristics and objectives 
that are reminiscent of the more continental two-tier boards. The fact is that the 
UK’s board of directors is increasingly becoming a monitoring and supervisory 
organ (at least in large corporations) with the representation of most outside and 
independent members and the delegating of ever more executive functions to inde-
pendent non-executive directors and other committees. On the other hand, the Ger-
man supervisory board is, in addition to its supervisory function, strengthening its 
strategic role within the German corporation. Further, some recent debate has sug-
gested a watering down of the two-tier board and co-determination laws in terms 
of corporate management,61 and that Germany is adapting towards a more Anglo-
American shareholder-orientated model.62 Nonetheless, there are also important 
differences. To be sure, the similarities between the structure and composition of 
the board of directors are an important aspect of corporate governance. However, 
the UK and Germany, due to their different political and social history, approach 
it differently. This will now be discussed in the following section.
61 J Du Plessis, & O Sandrock, ‘The Rise and Fall of Supervisory Co-Determination in Germany?’, 
at 67; D Otto, ‘German Co-Determination Culture Under Attack’ (2005) 45 Euro. Law 15; R Von Rosen, 
‘Corporate Governance in Germany’ (2007) 15(1) J Fin. Regulation and Compliance, 30. 
62 For a dominant account in corporate law that corporate governance is converging on the share-
holder-centric model, see H Hansmann, & R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, 
(2001) 89 Georgetown Law Review 439. For a discussion on the recent reform of shareholders’ 
rights in Germany, see HC Hirt, ‘The Enforcement of Directors’ Duties pursuant to the Aktienge-
setz: Present law and reform in Germany: Part 2’ (2005) 16(5) I.C.C.L.R. 216; L Miles, & 
S Zagelmeyer, ‘German Takeover Legislation: Implications for the future’ (2004) 15(7) I.C.C.L.R. 221. 
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IV. Cultural and Societal Aspects in Corporate Governance
It is important to note from the outset that the author accepts that although it might 
be desirable that corporations should, as a normative matter, pursue a Roman-
Germanic commitment to the neo-corporatist stakeholder conception of the corpo-
ration and the social market economy, the cultural and socio-political aspects of 
the existing legal and regulatory framework in the UK does not, in fact, support 
these reform initiatives in law and practice. Given that many such measures are 
now on the table “to fix” the organisational ills and corporate failures that have 
come to the fore during the most recent global financial crisis, it may be timely to 
identify the challenges facing UK corporations in implementing a corporate gov-
ernance regime based on continental standards and values. Every legal system has 
“many, many characteristics of structure, substance, and culture”.63 It follows that 
the greater the cultural distance between the host and adopter countries, the more 
difficult it will be to effectively implement foreign corporate governance strategies 
in the latter.64 It is the contention of this article that the UK has a corporate culture 
fundamentally different from Roman-Germanic jurisdictions. 
The ﬁrst and most signiﬁcant point to note is that the German model originated 
from a neo-stakeholder conception of the corporation during the 1920s, which posits 
the corporation as “a community of interdependence, mutual trust and reciprocal 
beneﬁts”.65 It is noteworthy the 1937 Stock Corporation Act in fact made explicit the 
point that management is independent from shareholders, when it prescribed that the 
management board “must not be as dependent as it has been in the past on the mass 
of irresponsible shareholders [emphasis added], who do not in general have the nec-
essary appreciation of the business situation.”66 Further, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) claimed that the principle of social responsibility was subsumed under 
the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz),67 as well as a variety of other regulations. 
Accordingly, corporations are viewed traditionally as public institutions with public 
63 LM Friedman, Law and Society: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, Aldershot, 1977) at 75.
64 L Miles, ‘The Cultural Aspects of Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea’ [2007] J Bus. 
L. 851, 876.
65 D Millon, ‘Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and law reform strategies’; in 
LE Mitchell (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995) at 1. 
66 See Para. 70 of the Stock Corporation Act 1937. This provision seems to characterise the tradi-
tional signiﬁcance attached to shareholders in the German corporate hierarchy, which is perhaps best 
viewed in the often quoted statement of a German banker a number of years ago: “Shareholders are 
dumb when they buy stock and impertinent because they also want a dividend.” See ‘Bündis Für Auf-
schwung Risikokapital – Der Neue Pﬂegedienst’, Focus Magazin, 25 Mar 1996 in TJ Andre, ‘Cultural 
Hegemony: the Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany’ (1998) 
Tulane L. Rev. 69, 105.
67 The Basic Law sets out a catalogue of liberal rights, but differs from the United States Consti-
tution, for example, by explicitly linking private property rights to obligations to support the public 
interest. Article 14, Para. 2 of the Basic Law states: ‘Property carries obligations. Its use should simulta-
neously serve the public good.’ The importance of this clause related to the notion of ‘socially limiting’ 
or embedded classic rights, and giving the State the duty to limit freedoms. 
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obligations and it is necessary to have mandatory rules to control what they and their 
managers do. In contrast, it is a well-settled principle of English corporate law that 
the corporate objective is aligned with shareholder interests or wealth maximisation. 
In what has become an important and well-known dictum, Evershed MR in the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas.68 said: “the phrase, ‘the 
company as a whole does not (at any rate in such a case as the present) mean the 
company as a commercial entity distinct from the [shareholders]. It means the [share-
holders] as a generally body.”69 Although it is debatable whether the courts ever, in 
fact, uniformly embraced the shareholder-orientated principle,70 it has now, in effect, 
been articulated in a statement on directors’ duties in the Companies Act 2006.71 As 
things stand, English corporate law, for the most part, other important constituencies 
that warrant attention from directors, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and the 
general community, lack any real substantive rule to provide adequate protection.72
The second aspect relates to the different approach between the two jurisdictions 
towards regulating corporate decision-making and behaviour. The German corporate 
governance framework can be characterised as ‘hard law’ with a stricter monitoring 
role for the supervisory board, and, as discussed above, what, in effect, is a set of 
established core responsibilities that are enshrined in law, which the management 
board owes to the former. In the UK, the regulation of corporations has traditionally 
adopted a more ‘soft law’ approach of “negotiated regulation”73 towards the business 
community, with an insufﬁciently deﬁned arrangement between the executives and 
the relatively recent inclusion of the independent non-executive’s role. Third, in the 
UK it is the shareholder’s general meeting that is responsible for the appointment and 
dismissal of executive directors. It follows that the shareholders’ interests are the 
prime concern of the directors and managers of the corporation. In the German cor-
porate governance structure, this responsibility is vested in the supervisory board, 
which, inevitably, permits a more powerful position for this administrative organ 
when compared to its UK counterpart, and means that the management board is 
accountable to a supervisory board that reﬂects the notion that people are part of a 
shared community who inherit the beliefs, values and goals of the community. The 
fourth point to make is that it is doubtful, due to political inertia, if the UK govern-
ment even wants to adopt the Roman-Germanic system since it seems quite content 
to permit the business community to regulate itself.74 While the criticism of “allowing 
68 [1951] Ch. 286, CA. 
69 Ibid. 
70 DJ Attenborough, ‘How Directors Should Act When Owing Duties to the Companies’ Sharehold-
ers: Why we need to stop applying Greenhalgh’ (2009) 20(10) I.C.C.L.R., 339, 343.
71 A Keay, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, the Reform of the Duties of Company Directors and 
the Corporate Objective’ [2006] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 335. 
72 Ibid.
73 A Dignam, ‘Exporting Corporate Governance: UK regulatory systems in a global economy’ 
(2000) 21(3) Co. Law. 70, 74.
74 For a relatively recent review of the development of corporate governance in the UK since 1992, 
see N Bourne, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK and Overseas’ (2007) 28(11) Bus. L. Rev. 292. 
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the inmates to run the asylum”75 is a fair one to make, for the UK legislature to impose 
stricter, more prescriptive regulation does not ﬁt in with the laissez-faire, free market 
tenets of English politics or the government’s stated objective to maintain the UK’s 
position as an attractive location for business.76 
A ﬁnal related point concerns the composition of the two supervisory boards. 
Considering the role of non-executive directors in corporate governance under UK 
law, it is suggested that the board is compiled of a group of executive and non-exec-
utive directors who are largely homogenous in background and sit on the same board. 
The current practice of recruiting non-executive directors appears to draw on an 
informal basis based on recommendations from fellow executives. They are a largely 
“self-perpetuating oligarchy”77 drawn from the same social, educational, business and 
economic background as the executives and might even be former or retired execu-
tives. They are therefore unlikely to take a hard line, e.g. as regards excessive remu-
neration since this will shape their own pay. Evidently, their independence is 
compromised right from the onset. Further, owing their appointment to their friends 
and their “cosy relationship with the executives”,78 they are unlikely to cause an upset 
or even ask probing questions. In some cases, this may be the intended outcome as 
some corporations appoint non-executive directors merely to meet the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance’ requirements. This hinders their objectivity and 
monitoring role. Conversely, the German supervisory board consists of a wider array 
of actors who represent a range of private interest groups, such as the employees or 
creditors, i.e. the institutional banks. It is fair to suggest that such actors will be bet-
ter places to challenge and probe; (2) inﬂuencing skills; (3) sound judgment; (4) good 
corporate governance guidance and communication; and (5) integrity and ethics. 
V. Conclusion
Following a series of corporate failures and wrongdoing around the turn of the 
twenty-first century, and the collapse or bailout rescues from government during 
the recent global financial crisis, corporate governance has indeed received much 
attention on an international level in the Post-Enron era. To address what are 
viewed to be the manifestations of lax corporate governance practices, various 
institutional measures are now under the microscope, and include issues relating to 
the management of systematic risk, the role played by institutional shareholders, 
incentives to manage risk in corporate remuneration policies, the competences 
needed on corporate boards, and board practices and structures. In the UK,  following 
the global financial crisis, the British government has announced an independent 
review to recommend measures to improve the corporate governance of UK 
75 A Dignam, ‘Exporting Corporate Governance’, at 70, 74.
76 Company Law Reform White Paper March 2005 (Cm 6456, BERR, 2005), p 8, and can be 
accessed at: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/white-paper/page22800.html> [Accessed 29 
 September 2009].
77 S Kiarie, ‘Non-executive Directors in UK Listed Companies’, at 17, 19.
78 Ibid.
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 corporations, particularly for the UK banking industry. This will be available by 
the end of 2009. The review reflects calls from the academic and business com-
munities for a radical reform of corporate governance structures. The focus of this 
article has thus been to examine how feasible it would be for the UK corporate 
system to abandon its one-tier management structure in favour of the continental 
style two-tier board. It has focused on the approaches in the UK and Germany. The 
structure and composition of the two board structures has been examined in the 
context of historical, political, economic and social factors, and, although it is 
accepted that there are some shared global norms, every country tends to approach 
corporate governance from its own cultural background and hence there are various 
approaches around the world. It is the contention of this article that unless there is 
something of a sea change of corporate culture in the UK, then the aforementioned 
factors will hinder any radical reform of corporate governance structures.
